A drift formulation of Gresham's Law by Smith, Reginald D.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
1.
35
80
v3
  [
q-
fin
.T
R]
  9
 A
pr
 20
12
A drift formulation of Gresham’s Law
Reginald D. Smith∗
( Dated: January 15, 2012)
In this paper we analyze Gresham’s Law, in particular, how the rate of inflow or outflow of
currencies is affected by the demand elasticity of arbitrage and the difference in face value ratios
inside and outside of a country under a bimetallic system. We find that these equations are very
similar to those used to describe drift in systems of free charged particles. In addition, we look at
how Gresham’s Law would play out with multiple currencies and multiple countries under a variety
of connecting topologies.
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO GRESHAM’S LAW
While the general mechanism of economics, adjust-
ment of supply and demand by feedback through pric-
ing, is generally known and appreciated, few specific eco-
nomic laws have wide awareness outside of the field like
Gresham’s Law. Gresham’s Law is the frequently quoted
(or mis-quoted) statement regarding the circulation of
multiple species of legal tender commodity money in an
economy where the overvaluing or undervaluing of either
relative to face value per unit weight can cause a rapid
shift in the availability of both where one can become
scarce while the other becomes plentiful. In its most
widely known formulation it states, “bad money drives
out good”, which is a shorthand to indicate the overval-
ued commodity currency becoming the dominant means
of exchange in the money supply while the undervalued
commodity currency becomes scarce in circulation as it
is hoarded or exported.
At the outset though, we need to be more specific in
defining terms. As remarked by Mundell [1], a more ac-
curate (though not perfect) statement of Gresham’s law
is “Bad money drives out good if they exchange for the
same price.” The concept of overvaluing or undervaluing
commodity money is due to the fact that a coin of certain
weight and purity has a defined legal tender value by the
issuer but the underlying commodity, typically gold or
silver, has its own demand separate from the demand for
money in the economy. Therefore, there can be a discon-
nect when the market value of the commodity of which
the money is made differs significantly from the required
legal tender value. When this occurs, one species be-
comes overvalued (“bad”) relative to the other currency
while the other becomes undervalued (“good”) relative to
the first. Since people will try to use the cheapest coin in
a transaction given the same face value, the depreciated
coin circulates while the other is hoarded or sold for a
profit.
Gresham’s Law has been long known, even before Sir
Thomas Gresham to whom it is attributed. In fact, Gre-
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sham himself did not purport to have discovered this
law but rather it was attributed to him by the British
economist Henry Dunning Macleod in 1858 [2] who be-
lieved Gresham had been the first to recognize this in
a letter to Queen Elizabeth I advising her that the de-
basement of the coinage by her father Henry VIII had
driven good coins out of circulation. The more exact
stating of the phrase “bad money drives out good” was
a paraphrasing of an anonymous 1696 pamphlet A Reply
to the Defence of the Bank, setting forth the unreason-
ablesness of their slow payments. Gresham’s Law had
been previously described even earlier by Nicole Oresme,
a philosopher in the Middle Ages [3] and Nicholas Coper-
nicus, who needs no introduction, in an essay on coinage
for Sigismund I, King of Poland [4].
The operation of Gresham’s Law has been viewed
throughout history. In the Middle Ages there were three
de facto commodity currencies: gold, silver, and copper
and currency shortages due to debasement of one versus
the other were common. There are also many recent his-
torical examples. One is the ushering in of the global
gold standard by the new nation Germany when in 1875
the Bank of Prussia declared it would only redeem ban-
knotes in gold and not silver. While there were multiple
causes for this, one was the decline in the silver price
after large discoveries, particularly in the United States,
which caused the silver coins to be overvalued relative
to gold as the price of silver dropped. This caused an
influx of silver into the country. The French led Latin
Union and all other nations of Europe soon followed in
demonetizing silver. Another example is in the United
States where the de facto establishment of the gold stan-
dard in the United States was effected in 1834 by the
1834 Coinage Act which set the gold:silver price ratio at
16:1 versus the prevailing world market ratio of 15.6:1.
This overvalued gold and caused an influx of gold and
the opposite effect on silver. Gresham’s Law would be
continuously invoked using this and other examples in
the fierce debates on bimetallism later that century.
2FIG. 1. Illustration of Gresham’s law at work in a gold/silver
bimetallic economy where gold is undervalued and silver is
overvalued so the Au/Ag ratio is lower than that of the wider
market.
II. A MATHEMATICAL ILLUSTRATION OF
GRESHAM’S LAW
In this paper, the key question we will address is how
rapidly does commodity money outflow/inflow from a
country when Gresham’s Law comes into play. Evidence
from times when Gresham’s Law has operated in the past
allude that the process can be quite rapid for even small
differential price changes. The outflow in both quantity
and total value can be shown to be quite large even in
the most marginal circumstances.
In figure 1 there are two countries (or a country and the
wider market) which have open trade and capital flows
allowing money of either species to circulate back and
forth. If the ratio of the face values of the currencies in
one country differ from the wider market, there will be
net flows of each currency in each direction. Here we will
first illustrate the case where two species of commodity
money, m1 and m2 circulate. Both have a global market
price ratio of R, the ratio of the price of m1 to m2 and a
local price in the domestic currency of P1 and P2.
In addition, there are net demand functions for the
commodity, Q1(P1) and Q2(P2) which describe the net
demand curve for the currency over and above the de-
mand for money when arbitrage opportunities emerge
from mispricing. If P1P2 = R then Q1 = Q2 = 0. Further,
assuming the overall money supply by value is unaffected,
when Gresham’s Law kicks in P1dQ1 = −P2dQ2.
Given the above, we can thus state the demand func-
tion for m1 alternatively as Q1(RP2) = 0. The change of
Q1, dQ1, if there is a change in the face value of the coin
from the market value of its metal can be given by
dQ1 = −
dQ1
dP1
∆P1 (1)
The negative sign is indicative of the fact that dQ1dP1 is
negative for demand and ∆P1 greater than zero indicates
an overvaluation which triggers inflows. This can be fur-
ther expanded using the basic equation for elasticity of
demand where the demand elasticity for m1 is E
1
d
E1d =
P1
Q1
dQ1
dP1
(2)
The equations can be combined to conclude
dQ1 = −Q1E
1
d
∆P1
P1
(3)
This shows that the differential quantity from equilib-
rium (in units of measurement such as tons) that flows
out of the country is the product of the quantity de-
manded in the market, the elasticity of demand for the
commodity arbitrage opportunity, and the % increase of
the face value over market value for the money. If you
want to look at the outflow in terms of the unit currency
we use dM(1) = dQ1P1
dM(1) = −Q1E
1
d∆P1 (4)
We use dM(1) notation to differentiate from the money
supply measure, M1.
We can further reduce this by ∆P1 = P1 −RP2 to get
dQ1 = −Q1E
1
d
(
1−
RP2
P1
)
(5)
dQ1 = −Q1E
1
d
(
1−
R
Rc
)
(6)
where Rc is the bimetallic ratio in the country that
differs from the market. Obviously if R/Rc = 1 there is
no net flow of currency. For the other species we have
given ∆P2 = P2 −
P1
R
dQ2 = −Q2E
2
d
(
1−
Rc
R
)
(7)
Given the above, why is the outflow so sudden and
huge in the case where face values and market values are
not equal? First, the elasticity of demand Ed is typically
large (and negative) for the demand curves facing arbi-
trageurs [5]. This combined with a likely high demand
Q1 by the market for the undervalued currency means
Rc 6= R will cause a huge flow under even a small differ-
ential between the market and legal tender ratios. This
effect is only delayed by factors such as transaction and
transport costs, historically estimated at about 1% of
face value for 19th century US coins. These factors show
why bimetallic regimes are often unstable to even small
changes in the face value or market price of the commod-
ity used as currency. If R is the Au/Ag ratio, when gold
becomes overvalued, like the ratio being raised 16:1 by
the 1834 Coinage Act instead of the 15.6:1 abroad, there
is a positive net inflow for gold and the opposite for silver.
If there is a time constant, τ for the quantity of demand
for a given currency, we can rewrite equation 6 as
3dQ1
dt
= −
Q1
τ
E1d
(
1−
R
Rc
)
(8)
and show the quantity over time of a misvalued cur-
rency can be approximated by
Q1(t) = Q1(0)e
−E1d
(
1− R
Rc
)
t/τ (9)
As a final note, the fact that P1dQ1 = −P2dQ2 we
have
Q1E
1
d∆P1 = −Q2E
2
d∆P2 (10)
Q1E
1
d
(
P1 −RP2
)
= −Q2E
2
d
(
P2 −
P1
R
)
(11)
Q1E
1
d = Q2E
2
d (12)
E1d
E2d
=
Q2
Q1
(13)
III. GRESHAM’S LAW AND DRIFT
For those familiar with physical processes of charge
carriers such as those dealt with in plasma physics or
materials science the equations above have a form that is
qualitatively similar to charged particle drift under an ex-
ternal electric field. Whereas in those situations we have
charge carriers of opposite sign, here we have currencies
that are overvalued or undervalued. The classic charge
density drift equation for a DC glow discharge plasma
with a homogeneous electric field is [6]
J = qnµE (14)
Where q is the unit charge of the charged particle, e
in the case of electrons, positrons, or protons, n is the
charged particle density, µ is the charge mobility, and E
is the electric field strength. A more comparable formu-
lation to equations 3 and 4 is
J = qnµ
∆V
d
(15)
The variable ∆V is the voltage difference and d is the
distance between the electrodes. Roughly, the quantity
demanded is comparable to qn, the demand elasticity to
FIG. 2. A simple representation of the similarities between
currency movements under Gresham’s law and electric parti-
cle drift.
µ, and the price differential to ∆V . This is illustrated in
figure 2.
IV. EXPANDED MODELS OF GRESHAM’S
LAW
For those interested in certain theoretical aspects of
Gresham’s Law beyond the real world typical case of
bimetallic regimes, this section will address three cases
of Gresham’s Law under expanded scenarios of multi-
ple currencies and countries. The number of currencies
will be designated by n and the number of countries des-
ignated by m. First, we will look at the situation with
m = 2 countries and n > 2 currencies, then n = 2 curren-
cies with m > 2 countries, and finally the complex case
of m > 2 countries and n > 2 currencies. In all cases,
all n currencies are legal tender in all m countries and
have face values assigned by each country. In addition,
the set of the values of the currencies are ordered sets so
that each currency has a relatively higher or lower value
to the same currencies across all countries. Finally, cur-
rencies will be labeled with numbers and countries with
letters.
A. Case of m = 2, n > 2
In this case, we have n currencies which will flow be-
tween the two countries in amounts corresponding to the
number of available arbitrage opportunities. The value
of any currency must be greater than zero so that the dis-
tribution of currency ratios for each currency pair in both
countries is a closed set on R+. For each currency which
has a face value that differs from the market value, it will
have arbitrage opportunities against all of the other n−1
currencies as an outflow or inflow (or both). If a number
of currencies, C, have different face values than market
value in the other country, we have nC2 possible arbitrage
pairs with a maximum of
(
n
2
)
if everything is given a face
value that differs from the market value abroad.
4FIG. 3. The effect of overvaluing currency 2 in country B.
For a given currency, the net flow is given by
∆Qi = −
n∑
j=1
Qi,jEd(i,j)
(
1−
Ri,j
Rc(i,j)
)
(16)
Next we assume the demand function, and thus Ed and
Q are identical across currency pairs for simplification.
∆Qi = −QEd
n∑
j=1
(
1−
Ri,j
Rc(i,j)
)
(17)
From equation 17 we can see that the summation can
be simplified to (n −
∑ Ri,j
Rc(i,j)
) and thus the sum that
determines the magnitude and direction of a currency’s
flow is
1
n
n∑
j=1
Ri,j
Rc(i,j)
(18)
If this quantity is less than 1 for a currency we have a
net inflow, otherwise there will be a net outflow. From
this it is obvious that the adjustment of the face value of
just one of the currencies is enough to unsettle the entire
equilibrium of currency flows between the two countries.
For example (see figure 3) imagine we have two coun-
tries, A and B, with five currencies, 1 to 5. The value
ratio of the currencies increases monotonically for a lower
number over a higher number with P1/P2 > 1 and the
highest ratio of all being P1/P5. If country B overvalues
currency 2, but not so much that P1/P2 < 1, it will cause
a drift in all the currencies. There will be a net inflow of
currencies 1 and 2 since 2 is overvalued versus 3, 4, and
5 and 1 is overvalued versus 2. Currencies 3-5 will out-
flow since they are now relatively undervalued but 2 will
also outflow since it is now undervalued with reference
to currency 1. The net flow of currency 2 will depend on
the relative volume of the arbitrage opportunity in each
direction.
B. Case of m > 2, n = 2
In this case, we have multiple countries but only two
currencies. At first glance, it would seem we could ex-
pand equations 3 and 6 to the case of summations across
multiple countries to find the drift amount for curren-
cies 1 and 2 in any given country i. However, here the
actual behavior departs from idealistic physics character-
izations and comparisons with charged particle behavior.
With only two currencies and multiple countries there
are multiple opportunities for arbitrage and given that
the cost of transaction and transportation are similar,
currencies will flow to the most profitable opportunity.
So for currency 1 in a country i the change to due arbi-
trage opportunities across all other countries indexed by
j, we have
∆Q1(i) = −Q1Edmax
j
(
1−
R(j)
Rc(j)
)
(19)
The implication from the maximization is that we min-
imize the quantity R(j)Rc(j) . Further, the flow of currency 2
in the opposite direction is given by
∆Q2(i) = −Q2Edmin
j
(
1−
Rc(j)
R(j)
)
(20)
The minimization occurs given the flow is the oppo-
site direction (negative) of currency 1. So here we must
maximize Rc(j)R(j) . Given this is the inverse of the previous
minimization of R(j)Rc(j) we find that the same country is
the target of inflows and outflows of both currencies. If
we consider the relative values of the currencies to be or-
dered sets with the same relative rank order for each cur-
rency in all countries, all countries will send the overval-
ued currency and receive the undervalued currency from
the country with the most lopsided ratio. This is illus-
trated in figure 4 where currency 2 is most overvalued in
country B.
FIG. 4. The flows of currencies for n = 2 and m > 2.
C. Case of m > 2, n > 2
In the most complex case, it would seem nearly in-
tractable given that at maximum disequilibrium you
5could theoretically have a
(
n
2
)(
m
2
)
number of possible ar-
bitrage trades. Granted, such a situation is likely never
to arise since the proliferation of so many types of legal
tender would defeat the purpose of money as a unit of
exchange in the first place. In this situation, though, a
similar maximization strategy would appeal since in any
country i, the currency j would be sent to country k
where it is most overvalued relative to other currencies.
In fact, if all m countries are connected as in a complete
graph, there is a country for each currency where it is
most overvalued relative to its value in all others since
the value of the currency must be positive. All other
countries will send currency inflows of currency j to this
country given it provides the maximum return.
It is possible for one country to have multiple curren-
cies that are most overvalued, but each currency must
have at least one country where it is most overvalued,
multiple if some countries have the same relative value
to the lowest currency. Again assuming a generic de-
mand function for each currency to keep the quantity
demanded and elasticity constant,
∆Qj(i) = −QjEdmax
k,l
(
1−
Rj,l(k)
Rc(j,l)(k)
)
(21)
Again, we have to minimize
Rj,l(k)
Rc(j,l)(k)
to maximize the
entire argument. The lowest valued currency, with a de-
fault relative value of 1 in the ordered set, is thus under-
valued in every country that has another currency most
overvalued and flows out to all the other countries as the
opposite outbound flow. Therefore, steady state will be a
group of countries with only the currency(ies) that they
most overvalue while the least value currency circulates
throughout the other countries.
Another possible situation under this model is where
the topology is not one of a complete graph where every
country (node) can have an inflow or outflow of currency
to another. This could likely cause local maxima to arise
given some nodes are not connected to the others where
the currency is most overvalued. Indeed this is the case.
In figures 5, 6, and 7 we show the result of m = 10, n = 5
on the topologies of a complete graph, a random network,
and a scale-free network.
In each graph, the red nodes indicate where one or
more currencies are locally overvalued and thus have in-
flows from other nodes. Only in the complete graph are
the red nodes indicative of global overvaluation since each
node connects to every other. The latter two topologies
have more nodes where currency is locally overvalued and
have inflows despite not being a global maximum. In-
deed, if one repeats the simulation 1000 times we find
the results in the table I to show that there are more
local maxima due to inhomogeneities in these stochas-
tic graphs than the complete graph situation. Therefore,
overvaluation and undervaluations of currency are more
likely to cause local rather than global flows across all
the countries.
Complete Random Scale-Free
Mean 3.9 6.4 5.8
Std. Dev. 0.9 1.3 1.4
TABLE I. The mean and standard deviation of the number of
vertices with locally overvalued currencies by topology from
a 1000 run simulation where m = 10, n = 5, and 〈k〉 = 4.8
for the random and scale-free networks.
V. CONCLUSION
Gresham’s Law may not rise to the level of a princi-
ple of physics and indeed even in economics it is often
carefully handled. For example, it does not apply to pa-
per money where you can often have dual circulations of
different banknotes in an unofficial capacity without one
driving the other out of circulation. This is often seen
with dollars in many countries, especially in the Western
hemisphere, Euros in parts of Eastern Europe not yet
on the currency, and the Renminbi in Hong Kong and
Southeast Asia. In these cases, only one currency is legal
tender and while one may have more value in the sense
of relative exchange rates of fiat money, the bill itself has
no underlying value.
In this paper it has been demonstrated that Gresham’s
Law is a phenomenon quite similar to drift where the
difference in valuation sets up pull similar to a potential
that drives inflows and outflows of currency in a bimetal-
lic regime. The rate of this flow is rapid due to its rela-
tion with the usually large elasticity of demand for arbi-
trage and is also proportional to the degree of imbalance
between the ratios of the two currencies in the country
and outside of it in the wider market. Free flow with
negligible costs and delays between countries leads to a
relatively few countries with the highest overvaluation
receiving inflows of all but the lowest denominated cur-
rency while connections through more complicated types
of networks lead to inhomogeneities and local minima for
currency inflows and outflows. In the end, however, in
almost all scenarios bimetallic or multimetallic currency
regimes are extremely unstable to fluctuations in the face
value that differ from market value. It is partially for this
reason that they were not preferred standards in the lat-
ter half of the 19th century.
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FIG. 5. Complete graph of m=10 with n=5. Red nodes show
countries with inflows of overvalued currencies.
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FIG. 6. Random graph of m=10, n=5 assuming p=0.48 for
graph creation. Red nodes show countries with inflows of
overvalued currencies.
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FIG. 7. Scale-free graph of 〈k〉=4.8. Red nodes show coun-
tries with inflows of overvalued currencies.
